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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4926
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH PRIORITY 2300
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK PRIORITY 2240
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH PRIORITY 2243
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 004118

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2017

TAGS: [MASS](#) [PTER](#) [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [MARR](#) [PGOV](#) [IZ](#) [TU](#)

SUBJECT: MCNS ON DECEMBER 16 DISCUSSED TURKISH ATTACKS,
HIGH-PROFILE KILLINGS, BASRAH PIC, RUSAF FACILITY, USG
SUPPORT OF ISF

REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 04025

[1](#)B. B) HILLAH 00169

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Classified By: Ambassador Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (S/REL UK AS) Summary: The Iraqi Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS) met December 16 to be briefed on Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I) contributions and support for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and to clarify funding procedures for the Rusafa Rule of Law (ROL) facility (ref. A). Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki delayed consideration of those topics with questions about Turkish airstrikes into northern Iraq and recent high-profile bombings. National Security Advisor (NSA) Mowafak Rubaie briefly reviewed the handover of Basrah to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC).

Turkish Attacks on PKK in Iraq

[1](#)2. (S/REL UK AS) PM Maliki opened the meeting with comment on the December 16 Turkish airstrikes into northern Iraq against PKK targets, noting that several Iraqi civilians had been killed and injured, which he called unacceptable. He expressed serious concern that the Turkish forces would harm Iraqis or damage Iraqi infrastructure, stressing the importance for the Turks to solely attack the PKK.

[1](#)3. (S/REL UK AS) Multi-National Forces in Iraq (MNF-I) Commanding General David Petraeus responded to Maliki by first noting that the Coalition had received only about 30 minutes of advance notification from the Turks, much less than he understood to have been agreed. MNF-I had shared the information of the imminent military action with the Iraqi National Operation Center (NOC) as well as the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). The airstrike targets were PKK camps in the Qandil Mountains area. Artillery also attacked PKK targets farther north, closer to the Turkish border. Coalition Forces were attempting to confirm reports from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that one woman was killed and four or five Iraqi civilians had been injured.

[1](#)4. (S/REL UK AS) CG further reported that he had called the Deputy Chief of Staff of Turkish Armed Forces, General Saygun, to confirm that the intended targets were only the PKK. Saygun had done so. Elaborating, CG stated that if the investigation confirmed Iraqis were injured, he would convey to Saygun that such was unacceptable to MNF-I. He suggested

that the Iraqi MFA through its channels, and possibly the PM via a call to Turkish PM Erdogan, convey their strong concerns that Iraqi civilians not be harmed through Turkish military action against the PKK.

15. (S/REL UK AS) Maliki said he would communicate with Turkey that that which harms Iraqis is unacceptable. He stated his intention to counsel patience on the part of the GOI and asked the CG if another attack was likely. CG candidly admitted that MNF-I had been taken somewhat by surprise - the Turks had not given as much warning as promised. He added that he would call Saygun again and let him know that he (Petraeus) hoped this action would be enough to satisfy the press and political activists in Turkey calling for action against the PKK. Real political engagement needs to continue to be developed between the GOI and the GOT, something the Coalition encourages.

Security Situation

16. (S/REL UK AS) Maliki expressed anxiety over the recent upsurge in violence in a few provinces, particularly the car-bombing in al-Amarah that left 25 dead and the assassination of Provincial Director of Police (PDOP) Qais in Babil (ref. B).

17. (S/REL UK AS) CG used the opening to give an overview of the security situation in the entire country, first addressing al-Amarah and Babil. It was unclear who was responsible for the violence in al-Amarah he said, speculating that the garage used by the perpetrators may have been a storage or assembly point. He noted that MNF-I does not have assets in al-Amarah, Maysan province, which has been under PIC for several months. Quickly reviewing the southern area, CG noted that Nasariyah city, and Qadasiyah, Najaf

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Muthanna, and Karbala provinces were doing well, with violence down significantly. Babil was another story, in light of the killing of the Provincial Police Chief, General Qais.

EFP used against Qais

18. (S/REL UK AS) CG stated categorically that Qais was killed by an Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP). Responding to the PM's questions, Deputy Minister of Interior for Police Affairs General Aiden stated that Qais had been killed by a powerful roadside Improvised Explosive Device (IED) that Sadr-linked terrorists from Baghdad had planted with help from criminals. He suspected the perpetrators had help from inside Qais' protection detail - his route and movement timing seemed to have been known to the attackers. General Aiden noted that the vehicle had not been destroyed by the blast, but two large pieces of projected shrapnel had penetrated the vehicle, killing Qais while sparing the lives of his driver and aide. This projected shrapnel, he added, had made two large holes in the vehicle as it penetrated the armor. He claimed to have arrested those involved with the exception of the direct perpetrator who had immediately escaped to Baghdad. This individual's ease of movement to and from Babil indicated negligence, or worse, on the part of checkpoint police. (Note: While maintaining that Qais was killed by a crude roadside IED, Aiden described the armor of Qais' vehicle as having been penetrated by projected metal, more consistent with an EFP. CG later presented PM with photos showing the penetration holes on the vehicle, again consistent with an EFP vice a crude IED. End note.)

Security Situation Overview continued

19. (S/REL UK AS) Returning to his overview of the security situation, the CG reported that Wasit province was showing

significant improvement. In particular, joint Iragi-Coalition checkpoints had not detected weapons or explosives in vehicles in recent weeks. Analysis was continuing on the meaning of this, but overall security was reasonably good in Wasit province.

¶10. (S/REL UK AS) Concern about Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) activity southeast of Baghdad remained. Successful ISF/MNF-I actions had driven most AQI out of Baghdad. While not finished, success was apparent as evidenced by local residents in the formerly challenged neighborhood of Ghazaliyah engaging in intra-sect soccer matches. Rogue Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and JAM Special Group elements, apparently acting against the instructions of Moqtadah al-Sadr, were a continuing concern, however.

¶11. (S/REL UK AS) In Anbar, AQI is failing at its efforts to stage a comeback. In Diyala, AQI was under steady pressure, though some elements remained, in particular in the Diyala River Valley and north of Muqtadiayah. The Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) groups were proving very helpful. Mosul continues to have problems, however, reinforcing the view that AQI sees it as integral to its efforts to establish a position in Ninevah province.

¶12. (S/REL UK AS) The Deputy Director of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) opined that the negligence of police at checkpoints may reflect overconfidence. He then complained that INIS receives little to no feedback on the actionable intelligence it delivers to the Baghdad Operations Center (BOC). A lively discussion involving the D/INIS, the DefMin, the D/MOI, and the PM on properly using intelligence brought to the BOC. After several minutes, CG intervened on behalf of INIS and BOC, noting that feedback was essential if INIS was to do its job and that the BOC was grossly understaffed. PM noted that Baghdad Commander General Abud must bring shortfall in staffing to the attention of the MNCS and that no one should relax their guard - the day we say we're safe, then we have a problem.

Basrah PIC

¶13. (S/REL UK AS) Entering late, NSA Rubaie reported that the PIC ceremony had gone very well, and that Governor Wa'eli was honoring his commitments to the PM. All political factions and parties were represented at the ceremony, Wa'eli called

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for the end of militias and for non-interference by the neighbors.

Rusafa Facility

¶14. (S/REL UK AS) Following up on last week's discussion (ref. A), the Minister of Finance raised the issue of funding the Rusafa ROL Facility through FMS contracts. The Minister of Justice objected. Soon the DefMin and the Chief of Defense Forces (CHOD) and the D/MOI joined the argument. CG intervened to note that the FMS process was transparent and that MNF-I staff were ready to assist the Ministry of Finance and others, but that one Ministry, preferably Finance, should have the contracting authority. PM concurred, and Finance was designated the Ministry in charge of contracting FMS for work on the Rusafa ROL Facility. (Comment- at last week's MCNS meeting, the PM designated the Minister of Justice to be solely in charge of contracting the complex.)

MNSTC-I Significant Contributions

¶15. (S/REL UK AS) MNSTC-I LTG Dubik briefed the committee on the successful engagement of his command with the ISF. He underlined the success over the last year in three areas: increased numbers of police and military personnel, increased

capabilities, and improved quality of the forces. With statistics (see para 17 below) as evidence of the success, Dubik emphasized that the significant increase in the number of trained officers and NCOs had already borne great results in the operational effectiveness of the ISF. He noted that both MOD and MOI had used national funds for personnel, equipment, and maintenance, though spotlighting shortfalls in MOI's budget execution.

¶16. (S/REL UK AS) DefMin Abdul Qadr applauded the support of MNSTC-I over the past year. The next year would see an emphasis on building infrastructure to support the forces and providing proper maintenance facilities at each operating base. The CHOD added that the ongoing maintenance costs of facilities and equipment would have to be funded and planned for in future budgets.

¶17. (S/REL UK AS) Statistics of recent and continuing support:

- Personnel expansion:
 - MOD security forces have expanded to 214 thousand
 - MOI security forces have expanded to 384 thousand
 - MOD's eventual goal is approximately 250 thousand; MOI's goal is 420 thousand
- MOD: Equipment, facilities, and maintenance support over the last six months:
 - USD 2.785 billion total
 - USD 795 million for construction
 - USD 54 million for training
 - USD 1.228 billion for equipment
 - USD 708 million for life support and maintenance
- Projected for the next nine months:
 - USD 1.622 billion total
 - USD 299 million for construction
 - USD 108 million for training
 - USD 918 billion for equipment
 - USD 297 million for life support and maintenance
- MOI: Equipment, facilities, and maintenance over the last six months:
 - USD 1.183 billion total
 - USD 34 million for ROL detainee operations
 - USD 507 million for construction
 - USD 464 million for training
 - USD 115 billion for equipment
 - USD 63 million for life support and maintenance
- Projected for the next nine months:
 - USD 1.423 billion total
 - USD 155 million for ROL detainee operations
 - USD 84 million for construction
 - USD 624 million for training
 - USD 435 billion for equipment
 - USD 125 million for life support and maintenance

MOI's failure to contribute

¶18. (S/REL UK AS) LTG Dubik revealed that the MOD had spent more than USD 200 million in national funds over the last

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year on equipment, training, and facilities and had programmed more than USD 1 billion for the next year. Unfortunately, MOI had expended only about USD 15 million of its national funds on equipment, training, and facilities. D/MOI responded that most of its costs were salaries. The PM rejoined that with only two weeks left in the year, but millions of dollars in its accounts, the MOI has large sums to spend on non-salary expenses. CG concurred, noting that it will be difficult to explain to U.S. audiences that the Iraqi security forces were not spending their budgeted national funds. PM directed the MOI and MOF to be prepared to re-engage the Council of Representatives on the reprogramming of funds to the MOI to support equipment purchases in 2007.

Wrapping up

¶19. (S/REL UK AS) NSA Rubaie called on the MCNS to applaud the efforts of MNSTC-I and the Coalition. CG noted that it had been a joint effort - one hand alone cannot clap. PM observed that two hands were needed, but one was certainly larger than the other. CG, joined by Embassy and UK Embassy, then offered best wishes to the Iraqis for Eid al-Adha. PM responded that all in Iraqi, regardless of religious faith, were entering a week-long festive season extending from Eid al-Adha through Christmas, in honor of which the next MCNS will be postponed until December 30.

¶20. (U) Happy Eid! Merry Christmas!
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